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Abstract
This paper presents an investigation about cooperation in a Public Good Game using
an Agent Based Model calibrated on experimental data. Starting from the experiment
proposed in Colasante and Russo (2016), we analyze the dynamic of cooperation in a Public
Good Game where agents receive an heterogeneous income and choose both the level of
contribution and the distribution rule. The starting point is the calibration and the output
validation of the model using the experimental results. Once tested the goodness of fit
of the Agent Based Model, we run some policy experiment in order to verify how each
distribution rule, i.e. equidistribution, proportional to contribution and progressive, affects
the level of contribution in the simulated model. We find out that the share of cooperators
decreases over time if we exogenously set the equidistribution rule. On the contrary, the
share of cooperators converges to 100% if we impose the progressive rule. Finally, the most
interesting result refers to the effect of the progressive rule. We observe that, in the case of
high inequality, this rule is not able to reduce the heterogeneity of income.
Keywords: Public Good Game, Cooperation, Social Influence
1 Introduction
Cooperation among animal and human species has been widely studied from different perspec-
tives ranging from social sciences to physics. Specifically, whereas physics mainly deals with the
emergence of cooperation or segregation (see, for instance Helbing et al. (2011)), mainstream
Economics suggests a selfish view of human actions, where agents maximize their own profit. A
more recent economic literature, however, shows that agents are not selfish (Kolm and Ythier
(2006)), but often they are willing to cooperate also with strangers (Andreoni et al. (2008),
Tedeschi et al. (2014), Vitali et al. (2013)). The wide literature in Experimental and Behavioral
Economics try to understand the reason behind this behavior which seems to characterize human
being. Using different kind of games such as Prisoner Dilemma, Ultimatum Game and Public
Good Game, economists have shown that subjects do not behave as an homo œconomicus but
they are, on average, altruist in a bilateral game or they behave as an homo reciprocans in a
multi-player setting (Fehr and Ga¨chter (1998)).
By employing a repeated Public Good Games (PGG hereinafter) it has been shown that
cooperation, measured by the level of contribution to a public fund, even if decreases over time,
always remains positive (Chaudhuri (2011)). Furthermore, the introduction of a punishment
(see Nikiforakis and Normann (2008)) or a reward (see Szolnoki and Perc (2010)) in the context
of a PGG has a positive impact on cooperation. Agents, in fact, are willing to sustain a costly
punishment to educate defectors in order to increase the level of cooperation and, so, their future
benefits.
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It is worth noting that, standard PGG just includes a simple control variable, namely the
decision to contribute or not and, possibly, the amount of the contribution. An interesting ex-
ception is the game described by Colasante and Russo (2016). These authors present a PGG
experiment with human subjects, where participants receive different initial endowments (or in-
come) and they have not only to decide the amount of the contribution to the public fund, but
also how to split the public good. Indeed, after all agents have chosen their amount of contribu-
tion, subjects in the same groups vote for the distribution rule among three feasible alternatives:
i) equidistribution i.e. the public good is equally split among players independently on their
contribution; ii) proportional to contribution i.e. the higher the contribution, the higher the
share of the public good; iii) progressive i.e. agents with low endowment receive high share
independently of their contribution.
According to the experimental evidence, the level of contribution is increasing over repetitions.
This means that the possibility to decide how to split the public good is an alternative to costly
punishment or reward to sustain cooperation.
This paper aims to shed light on the emergence of cooperation in the PGG experiment pro-
posed by Colasante and Russo (2016). By developing an Agent-Based Model (ABM, hereinafter)
reproducing the experimental setting of Colasante and Russo (2016), we analyze the evolution of
cooperation along a dynamic path in terms of percentage of cooperators, and the impact of the
three distribution rules in generating it. The robustness of the model in reproducing experimen-
tal data is then tested via the parameters estimation. Specifically, we show that the simulated
time series generated by the agent-based model well reproduce the experimental data. Moreover,
the calibration of the model parameters provides some information on the behavior of human
subjects. In fact, the values of the parameters resulting from the model calibration show the
differences and the similarities in the behavior of agents using different distribution rules.
There are many techniques to calibrate and validate ABMs. Janssen and Ostrom (2006)
identify three useful environments in order to calibrate the model parameters: a) empirical data
(see Recchioni et al. (2015) and Alfarano et al. (2007)), b) survey and/or interviews (Garcia
et al. (2007)), c) experiments (Roth and Erev (1995)). Moreover, different validation techniques
have been also proposed (see Sargent (2013)). Windrum et al. (2007), for instance, propose the
so-called Werker-Brenner approach consisting in different phases. First, to identify the main
stylized facts one wants to reproduce. Second, to include the use of the real data, empirical
or experimental, to identify the most important parameters and/or the main behavioral rules.
Finally, after obtaining results, to implement a validation exercise able to reproduce all the
possible scenarios obtained by changing the initial conditions.
The process of validation and calibration of ABM with experimental data is one of the
most innovative techniques. Experiments, both field and lab, are useful to observe directly the
individual behavior in a controlled setting. Especially in the lab, it is possible to control all
the variables involved except one, the control variable. This procedure allows to understand
the effect of the control variable on the real choices. Moreover, experiments allow us to observe
agents’ interactions and, consequently, to derive aggregate properties which are the self-organized
outcomes of the interactions of components (see for instance Tedeschi et al. (2012)).
In this paper, we follow the Werker-Brenner approach. Specifically, we firstly use experimental
results and the behavioral rules highlighted in the empirical investigation of Colasante and Russo
(2016) to calibrate the initial parameters of the model. Then, after checking the ability of the
model to accurately match the experimental results, we change the value of the calibrated model
parameters in order to identify the effect on the evolution of cooperation under the three different
distributive rules. In particular, we check the effect of imposing a specific rule in all periods. The
aim of these experiments is to understand how the cooperation, and so the contribution, evolves
according to different distribution rules. Our finding shows that the higher level of cooperation
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is reached by applying the proportional rule. The most interesting results regards the relation
between cooperation and inequality. Indeed, we find out that, by imposing the progressive
rule in presence of high inequality, we observe a high level of cooperation but a low reduction of
inequality. This result seems to be in contrast with the aim of the rule, i.e. reduce the initial level
of inequality. The explanation behind this evidence relies on the low willingness to contribute of
rich agents in the case of progressive rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we describe the ABM and in
Section 3, we show the main results of the model both in terms of replication of the real data
and the validation exercise. Finally, in Section 4, there are the conclusion and the final remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Summary of the lab experiment
In this Subsection we briefly describe the experiment proposed by Colasante and Russo (2016)
which is an extension of the PGG. Specifically, we present the key ingredients used to build
the agent-based model which has to computationally reproduce the laboratory experiment. In
the experiment, at the beginning of the round, each subject receives an endowment which can
be used to contribute to a public fund. The experiment consists in comparing the individual
behavior in terms of contribution to a public fund with different level of inequality. In fact, there
are three different treatments: Treatment 1 with no inequality, Treatment 2 with a low level
of inequality and Treatment 3 with high inequality. The difference among treatments are well
explained in the next Subsection.
After receiving the endowment, each subject chooses the amount to put in the public fund.
The difference between the endowment and the contribution constitutes a gain for the subject.
Each player i decides the amount to put in the public fund git. The sum of the contribution of
players in the same group constitutes the public good, i.e. the public good is given by
Gt = δ ∗
5∑
i=1
git (1)
which 1 < δ < N represents the efficiency factor, i.e the synergetic effect of cooperation. In
the experiment we set δ = 2. Usually, in the standard PGG, the public good is split equally
among the components of the group. In the setting proposed by the authors, subjects decide
how to split G by voting for one of the three feasible rules: equidistribution, proportional and
progressive. Each rule has a specific impact on the income distribution. In particular, we
expect that the equidistribution rule leaves the same level of inequality, while the proportional
rule is expected to raise heterogeneity and, finally, the progressive rule has the aim of reducing
inequality. The rule receiving the majority of votes (i.e. at least 3 votes over 5) will be applied.
At the end of each period the profit are computed. The profit function is:
piit = dit − git + αit−1 ∗Gt (2)
where α is the share of the public good gained. The value of α changes according to the
chosen rule, i.e. the
• Equidistribution: α = 1n ;
• Proportional: α = gi∑5
i=1 gi
;
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Figure 1: Distribution of of the endowment in Treatment 2 and Treatment 3.
• Progressive: α = 1n−1
(
1− di∑5
i=1 di
)
.
After the first period the endowment depends on the performance of the previous period, i.e.
dit = di0 +αit−1 ∗Gt. This sequence of events is repeated for five periods. Throughout the whole
game, subjects interact with the same people which are part of their own group.
2.2 Implementation of ABM
In order to reproduce the observed behavior in the laboratory experiment, we build an ABM
with four groups of five people each, i.e. n = 5 is the number of people in each group and N = 20
is total number of agents for each treatment. Each subject only interacts with its neighborhood
for all the 5 periods (T = 5). We consider three frameworks in which the initial distribution of
the endowment changes to mimic the three experimental treatments. The treatments differ in
the initial level of heterogeneity in the endowment distribution. In Treatment 1 (T1) all agents
receive the same initial endowment (di0) equal to 100. In Treatment 2 (T2) and Treatment 3
(T3) the distribution is such that the Gini index is equal to 0.2 and 0.6, respectively. Figure 1
shows the distributions in T2 and T3. The distribution of the endowment within the group is
common knowledge, this implies that each agent is aware of the level of inequality in its own
group.
We calibrate the initial parameters using at the experimental data. The first parameter is the
percentage of cooperators in the first period, i.e. CT1 = C
0
T1, CT2 = C
0
T2 and CT3 = C
0
T3. Since
in the lab experiment the choice to contribute is not a binary choice, we define as cooperator
those who contribute at least the 50% of their endowment. We split agents between Cooperators
(C) or Defectors (D) according to this rule.
The percentage of cooperator is set as a parameter only in the first period. In the subsequent
periods the decision to cooperate is endogenous and it depends on the rule chosen in the previous
period, i.e. equidistribution, proportional to contribution or progressive to endowment. For each
of these rule, we choose simple mechanisms to define if agent i belongs to the set of cooperators.
Regarding the Equidistribution rule, the theoretical predictions (see for example Fischbacher
and Ga¨chter (2010)) suggest that, in the standard PGG, the best individual strategy is to free
ride, i.e. gi = 0. In the experiment we observe that subjects behave as a conditional cooperators,
meaning that they are willing to increase their contribution if they observe a cooperative behavior
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in the group. This evidence is well explained in the empirical analysis of Colasante and Russo
(2016). Considering these facts, we build a model such that the probability to be a cooperator
is a function of the observed aggregate contribution. In particular, the probability increases if
the aggregate contribution increases by at least 40% than in the previous period. Moreover, it
has been shown in previous experiments that the percentage of contribution decreases over time.
To take into account also this important feature, the probability to be a defector increases with
time.
Regarding the Proportional rule, this guarantees each agent to receive back an amount greater
than the contribution in any case. This implies that the individual decision on being cooperator
depends on a rule of thumb based on the profit analysis. According to this rule, agent i is a
cooperator if (piit−1 − piit−2) > 0 and a defector otherwise.
The decision to be a cooperator if the chosen rule in the previous period was the Progressive
one depends on the individual endowment. Agents are split between rich and poor. Agents with
an endowment higher than the average are defined as “rich”, otherwise they are “poor”. Since the
progressive rule is in favor of the poor agents independently of their contributions, the probability
to became a cooperator for the poor (P (C)poor) is higher than that for the rich (P (C)rich). We
calibrate this probability looking at the percentage of cooperators in the experiment. According
to the experimental data, we observe that, in many cases, the willingness to cooperate for rich
agents decreases if the progressive rule is often chosen and the reverse holds for poor agents.
This implies that in the model the value of P (C)rich , i.e. the probability to be a cooperator for
rich agents, decreases during repetitions, while P (C)poor increases over time.
In the empirical investigation proposed by Colasante and Russo (2016), authors find out that
players show the so-called inequity aversion. This kind of behavior has a strong influence on the
chosen rule, i.e. it has been shown that the higher the level of inequality, the higher the frequency
at which the progressive rule has been chosen. To take into account this aspect, we implement
a mechanism of the distribution rule choices depending on the Gini coefficient, i.e. a measure
of inequality in the group. The rule is chosen according to a random selection from a normal
distribution. The mean of the distribution depends on the degree of inequality in the group,
i.e.the probability to choose a Progressive rule increases with inequality. The Gini coefficient is
computed using the following equation:
Ginit = 1−
∑n
i=1 f(di)(Si−1 + Si)
Sn
(3)
where di are the endowment set in a not decreasing order and Si =
∑i
j=i f(dj)dj .
The robustness of our qualitative results has been checked by using Monte Carlo techniques.
We have run 200 independent simulations for different values of the initial seed generating the
pseudo-random numbers. All the initial parameters are based on the experimental ones. We use
equations (1) and (2) to compute, respectively, the amount of the public good and the individual
profit.
3 Main results
In this Section we show the main results of the simulation. To obtain our results we follow these
steps: first, we make an exercise of output calibration starting from the real experimental data.
The aim of this exercise is to check if the ABM is able to match the laboratory data. Second,
we test the impact of each specific rule on cooperation. Specifically, we focus on the effect on
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both the distribution of the endowment and the share of cooperators for a given rule. In order
to do so, we exogenously set the same rule in all periods.
Let’s start to analyze our calibration procedure. We set the value of the percentage of
cooperators in each treatment equal to CT1 = 40%, CT2 = 30% and CT3 = 40%. We also set the
mean and standard deviation of the contribution in percentage term for both cooperators and
defectors. The value of these parameters are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameters of the model
T1 T2 T3
Cooperators µC = 0.6, σC = 0.3 µC = 0.55, σC = 0.1 µC = 0.55, σC = 0.2
Defector µD = 0.3, σD = 0.1 µD = 0.3, σD = 0.1 µD = 0.25, σD = 0.1
Following the output calibration procedure, after setting the value of the initial parameters,
we compare the main results of the model with the experimental data. In particular, we take into
account the average contribution in percentage term, i.e. the average share of the endowment in
each period for all the agents, and the chosen rule in each treatment.
As Figure 2 shows, the simulated time series are good in reproducing the average contribution
observed in the experimental data. To test whether results emerging from the simulations are
close to real data, we compare these results running a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. In all the cases
the test is not able to reject the null hypothesis at 5% conventional level of confidence (T1:p-
value= 0.207; T2:p-value=0.456; T3:p-value= 0.182). We also run a Wilcoxon test. Also this test
confirms the equality of the distributions (T1: p-value= 0.345; T2:p-value=0.138; T3:p-value=
0.685).
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Figure 2: Aggregate contribution in percentage of the endowment. Each sub-graph shows the time
series of simulated and experimental data and its standard deviation. Grey squared lines
reproduce simulated data. Black circle lines reproduce experimental data.
Figure 3 shows the frequency distribution for each rule in the different treatments. By using
the rule based on the inequity aversion, the simulated results are very close to the real ones.
Indeed, in the model relative to T1 the progressive rule has been never chosen in both the
simulated and the real data. Our results confirm that the behavioral rules implemented for the
choice of both the level of contribution and the distribution rule are able to replicate the behavior
of agents during the experiment.
Once the real data are replicated, the model could be used to run some experiments. Specif-
ically, we are interested in analyzing how imposing a specific rule affects subjects’ cooperation.
Unlike what happens during the experiment in which players can choose one of the feasible rules,
we are interested in understanding how the results change if we impose a specific rule. To observe
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Figure 3: Percentage of the chosen rule in each Treatment. Grey bars indicate experimental data.
Black bars indicate simulated data.
these results we exogenously fix a specific rule, keeping unchanged other parameters. The aim of
this experiment is to investigate if, and under which conditions, the contribution increases over
time.
Figure 4 shows the aggregate contribution and the percentage of cooperators emerging in the
model relative to T1, i.e. the treatment in which there is no initial inequality. Note that we
have omitted the results relative to the progressive rule because, in the case in which all agents
receive the same endowment, the equidistribution and the progressive rule lead to the same
results. By imposing the equidistribution rule in each period, both the average contribution and
the percentage of cooperators decrease over time. This result is consistent with the evidence of
the classic PGG where subjects have no incentive to cooperate if they are aware that the game is
ending. On the other hand, if the proportional rule is chosen in all periods, all the agents become
cooperators and they contribute with the whole endowment to the public good. The high level of
cooperation reached with the proportional rule allows agents to accumulate a huge public good
and, as a consequence, to increase their wealth in the subsequent periods. The disadvantage
linked to this rule is that the inequality increases. As shown in Figure 5, the endowment is very
high in the case of the proportional rule although the distribution is more heterogeneous.
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(a) Average contribution in percentage term.
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(b) Percentage of cooperators.
Figure 4: Pannel (a) shows the average contribution relative to each rule in Treatment 1. Pannel (b)
shows the percentage of cooperators in Treatment 1. In each pannel, the diamond black line
refers to the equidistribution rule, the square gray line refers to proportional rule.
Figure 6 shows the average contribution to the public good and the share of cooperators in
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Figure 5: Decumulative Distribution of the endowment in the first and in the last period in Treatment
1.
the model relative to T2. Also in this case, considering the equidistribution rule the contribution
declines over time and the share of cooperators goes to zero. Regarding the proportional rule,
also in this setting there is a convergence to the full contribution. Looking at the progressive
rule, the share of cooperators slightly decline during repetitions, while the average contribution
remains fairly stable. The decline of cooperators is strongly influenced by the presence of “rich”
agents, i.e. half of agents holds an income above the mean, who have no incentive to cooperate
if the progressive rule is chosen for more than two periods. As shown in Figure 7, by imposing
the proportional rule the inequality significantly increases, while, the progressive rule does not
change the endowment distribution.
The same results emerge Figure 8, that is the highest contribution in the model relative to T3
corresponds to the proportional rule. The main difference is about the progressive rule. In this
case, the percentage of cooperator remains close to the 80% and also the average contribution.
This is because in this scenario the majority of players are “poor” and so they have the full
incentive to cooperate.
The impact of these different rules on the endowment distribution is very different. As Figure
9 shows, the equidistribution rule leaves the distribution unchanged and increases the average
endowment of players also in the case of high inequality. The proportional rule guarantees the
high level of income but, at the same time, it increases the inequality and it benefits rich agents.
The result regarding the progressive rule is the most interesting. If agents always choose this
rule a double effect emerge. One the one hand, the degree of inequality decreases, i.e. in the
case of T3 the inequality decreases by 20%. This effect is the natural consequence of this rule,
since it benefits the poor agents even if they are defectors. On the other hand, the growth rate
of the endowment is very low and, even more important, the higher the inequality, the lower is
the growth rate. These contrasting results lead to an important conclusion. The progressive rule
increases the endowment of the poor players independently of their contribution and consequently
reduces inequality. According to the results of the ABM, after 5 period the average endowment
of poor agents increases by 400%, while that of rich agents increases only by 7%. Nevertheless,
the gap between the highest and the lowest income is still very high until the last period. If the
difference between poor and rich is very high –for example the case of T3–, it is very difficult
to increase the level of contribution to the public good and so to have a strong reduction of
the inequality. This is also the main cause of the effect on the low growth rate of the average
endowment. Indeed, the endowment of poor agents slowly increases during repetitions and so
their “contributive capacity” remains too low to rise the amount of the public good. This implies
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that the public good remains, in all cases, very low and so the growth rate of the endowment is
very slow.
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Figure 6: Pannel (a) shows the average contribution relative to each rule in Treatment 2. Pannel (b)
shows the percentage of cooperators in Treatment 2. In each pannel, the diamond black line
refers to the equidistribution rule, the square gray line refers to proportional rule and the
triangle gray line refers to the progressive rule.
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Figure 7: Decumulative Distribution of the endowment in the first and in the last period in Treatment
2.
4 Conclusion
In this work we present an agent based model calibrated using experimental data. The starting
point is the experiment proposed in Colasante and Russo (2016) which is a PGG where players
choose both the contribution and the distributive rule. Agents choose among three different rules:
Equidistribution –the amount is equally split among all players–, Proportional to contribution
–the share of public good is proportional to the contribution– and Progressive to endowment
–the share of public good is inversely proportional to the endowment. Each of these rules
has a different impact on the income distribution. We build a model based on three different
frameworks, one for each treatments, i.e. T1 in which there is no initial inequality, T2 in which
Gini coefficient is equal to 0.2 and T3 in which the Gini coefficient is equal to 0.6. The model is
based on the experimental data and we implement behavioral rules deriving from the empirical
investigation of Colasante and Russo (2016).
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Figure 8: Pannel (a) shows the average contribution relative to each rule in Treatment 3. Pannel (b)
shows the percentage of cooperators in Treatment 3. In each pannel, the diamond black line
refers to the equidistribution rule, the square gray line refers to proportional rule and the
triangle gray line refers to the progressive rule.
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Figure 9: Decumulative Distribution of the endowment in the first and in the last period in Treatment
3.
After testing the model ability in reproducing the experimental data via an output validation
procedure, we run some policy experiments. Specifically, we analyze how the share of cooperators
and, in turn, the contribution change according to different rules. To analyze this aspect we fix
exogenously one rule for all repetitions. Results show that, by imposing the equidistribution
rule, the share of cooperators decreases over repetitions in all treatments. The proportional
rule leads to an increase of cooperators and, at the same time, a strong change in the income
distribution. The most interesting result refers to the progressive rule. By imposing this rule
for all the periods there is no clear effect on the income distribution. Especially considering the
income distribution in T3, we observed that poor players increases their income but, the huge
difference between rich and poor persists until the last round. This effect is peculiar since the
main goal of the progressive rule should be to reduce the initial inequality.
A policy implication emerges from this analysis: in case of very high inequality, it is necessary
to increase the endowment of the very poor agent in order to give them the possibility to increase
their contribution to the public good. The joint effect of the progressive rule and the behavioral
rule of rich agents, i.e. they reduce their contribution if the progressive rule is often chosen, is
that there is no enough money in the public fund that could be used to reduce inequality.
The next step of the analysis will be to provide additional evidence about the importance of
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the contribution by rich players. The future investigation will focus on the comparison between
a groups with and without rich cooperators.
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